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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESs-REGULATION OF ONE MAN STREET
CARS.-In the case of the City of Shreveport v. Shreveport Ry. Co. (C. C.
A. 5, 1930) 38 F. (2d) 945, an injunction was granted against the en-
forcement of an ordinance requiring two man street cars on the ground
that the company would not get a fair return on its investment should
it be denied the right to operate one man cars, and therefore the ordi-
nance was held unreasonable and confiscatory and void under the Four-
teenth Amendment. The U. S. Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ
of certiorari to the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the fifth circuit.
(1930) 281 U. S. 763. The same ordinance which was enjoined here was
held valid in Sullivan v. City of Shreveport (1919) 251 U. S. 169, in the
absence of a showing that substitutes for the two man car would be safe
and convenient for the public, and it is on this ground that the ordinance
was here held invalid because of changed conditions.
Similar ordinances have been held valid as proper exercises of the police
power. City of Dayton, Ohio v. City Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 1926) 16 F. (2d)
401; Connecticut Co. v. City of New Haven (1925) 130 Atl. 169; Third
Avenue Ry. Co. v. Godley et al. (1930) 227 App. Div. 568, 238 N. Y. S. 380;
City of Shreveport v. Sullivan (1917) 142 La. 573, 77 So. 286; Des Moines
City Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street & Electric Ry. Employees
(1927) 204 Iowa 1195, 213 N. W. 264.
The court in the instant case accepted the argument of the street rail-
way company on the showing that modern safety devices had made the
one man car as safe as the two man type. The decision of the court was
also influenced by the fact that operation of the one man cars would re-
duce the labor costs of the company thus allowing a fair return on its
investment and that the extra cost of two man cars could not be met by
increased fare, for the steady decrease in the number of passengers car-
ried showed that the traffic would not bear an increased fare.
However, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the reasonable-
ness of a city ordinance requiring a definite type of protection to the
public, even though since its enactment there had been devised safety
features claimed to equal or excel the protection sought by the ordinance,
if there was any reasonable ground for believing that compliance with the
ordinance at the crossing in question would diminish the danger of acci-
dents. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. White (1929) 278 U. S.
456. What is a reasonable ground for such belief it has been held should
be left up to the legislative body making the ordinance, for it is more
familiar with the peculiar needs of the community than the court on re-
view, the legislature is presumed to have decided on its position after
considering both sides of the question, and its judgment in such matters
of police power is entitled to great respect and often to complete accept-
ance from the judicial branch of the government. City of Dayton v. City
Ry. Co., above.
However, the decision of the court in the instant case seems justified
on the basis of the established doctrine that an ordinance though reason-
able as applied to conditions existing at the time of its adoption, may be-
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come unreasonable by a change in conditions, and that a city may not im-
pose unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations under the guise of
protecting public interest. Dobbins v. Los Angeles (1904) 195 U. S. 223;
Bluefield v. Public Service Commission (1923) 262 U. S. 679.
The court's stand in this case is further substantiated by the fact, which
it points out, that of the 106 cities in this country having a larger
population than Shreveport, 103 have one man cars in operation.
In deciding cases arising under such ordinances courts should be in-
fluenced on the one hand by the doctrine of the U. S. Supreme Court that
if any set of facts can be found which would justify the statute as to its
constitutionality, the legislature will be presumed to have had that in
mind. On the other hand the court should take into consideration the
diminishing returns of street railway companies due to automobiles and
busses. In the last analysis each case should be decided in the light of
the circumstances at the time in the particular community. M. E. S., '31.
TORTS-LIABILITY OF PROPERTY OWNER TO INVITEE.-The case of Sinn
v. Farmers' Deposit Saving Bank (1930) 300 Pa. 85, 150 Atl. 163, goes far
in extending the doctrine of tort liability of owners of real property to
invitees. The plaintiff, a customer, entered the defendant bank at a time
when an extortionist who had threatened to discharge a bomb, which he
carried concealed in a small hand-bag, was waiting for compliance on the
part of the bank's officers. The customer, ignorant of the threatened dan-
ger, was asked by a bank official to step to a more distant window. Police
officers approached the bomber, who discharged the explosive and injured
the plaintiff. The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, holding the
bank liable for failing to warn the plaintiff of the danger.
A proprietor of a business is under a duty to warn invitees of dangers
or dangerous defects of which the invitee is not aware and of which the
invitor knows or should know. Montevallo Mining Co. v. Little (1922) 208
Ala. 139, 93 So. 873. This duty applies only to defects or conditions which
are in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like.
45 C. J. 837. Woids a bit more broad in their connotation are found in
Bristillos v Southwestern-Portland Cement Co. (Tex. 1919) 211 S. W.
929, where the court said: "He owes a duty to have the place in a reason-
ably safe condition and to give warning of latent or concealed perils," in
holding an invitor liable for hidden danger to which a human force con-
tributed. In the case of Selinas v. Vt. State Agric. Society (1888) 60 Vt.
249, 15 Atl. 117, the defendant was held liable where the plaintiff was upon
its grounds attending a public exhibition and was struck by a third party
swinging a mallet to hit a striking machine about which there was no
guard.
A liability still more extensive is described in Fredericks v. Atlantic Re-
fining Co. (1925) 252 Pa. 8, 127 Atl. 615, where the court said that an in-
vitor is answerable "if he negligently permits a danger of any kind to ex-
ist which results in injury."
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